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Groups and Human Rights 
 
Peter Jones 
 
Human rights are rights possessed by human beings, and human beings are individual beings.  
An individualism that gives primary moral standing to individuals is therefore built into the 
very idea of human rights.  However, the description ‘individualist’ is often applied to human 
rights in a more far-reaching and pejorative sense.  Human rights are sometimes said to 
manifest an atomistic conception of human life in which individuals are set apart from one 
another and channelled away from communal to more individualistic forms of life.  Human 
rights, the charge goes, fail to recognise and to provide adequately for the social nature of 
human beings and the value of human community.  The charge is not easily sustained 
(Howard 1995).  Human rights are thoroughly social in both context and purpose and, rather 
steering people away from communities, they aim to secure the freedoms and social 
arrangements that are essential for living a decent human life of any sort, including the most 
communitarian of communal forms of life.   
There is, however, one aspect of the argument over the ‘individualism’ of human 
rights that continues to divide the proponents of human rights as well as to attract the 
attention of the critics:  the relationship between groups and human rights.  There is 
continuing division over whether human rights can be group rights or whether they can be 
possessed only by individuals taken severally.
1
  It is that question that I investigate in this 
essay.   
I shall use the terms ‘individual right’ and ‘group right’ to describe the holder of a 
right.  So when we ask whether group rights can be human rights, I take the question to be 
whether some human rights can be held by groups rather than by persons individually.  
Nowadays, the term ‘group right’ is often used to describe a right that a person holds qua 
group member.
2
  That is a quite different, and potentially misleading usage, since the rights 
people hold as group members can be, and most commonly are, rights they hold as 
individuals.  For example, the rights people hold as members of sports clubs or gardening 
clubs or trade unions or universities or churches are commonly rights that they hold and 
exercise as individuals.  The same applies to many ‘ascriptive’ groups.  The UN, for example, 
has declarations and conventions that provide specifically for the human rights of women, 
children, older persons, disabled persons, persons with mental illness, refugees, and stateless 
persons.  Once again, the great majority of the rights assigned by these declarations and 
conventions are assigned to individuals; the mere fact that they are assigned to particular 
categories of individual is no reason to label them ‘group’ or ‘collective’ rights (cf. Felice 
1996). 
I shall understand human rights to be the rights that people have, or that they are 
assigned, in virtue of being human persons.  Hence, while I draw my examples primarily 
from UN and other formal human rights documents, I do not treat those documents as 
definitive of whether a right is an authentic human right.  I shall also understand human rights 
as primarily moral rather than legal rights, although that distinction will not be significant for 
much of what I argue.   
Groups can be of various sorts: voluntary, involuntary, organised, unorganised, 
ascriptive, identity-based, and so on.  None of those differences in type provides the essential 
test of whether a group is, or might be, a right-holder.  I follow Joseph Raz’s interest theory 
of rights according to which A has a right if he possesses an interest of sufficient moment to 
ground a duty for B (Raz 1986, 166).  If we adopt that theory, the critical test of whether a 
group has a right will be whether it has an interest, qua group, of the required sort.  That test 
may be contingently related to other features of a group, such as whether it is formally 
organised or has a strong sense of its own identity, but the ultimate test will be whether the 
group has an interest of the right sort rather than what sort of group it is.  For example, 
according to the interest theory, it is perfectly possible for a linguistic group to have a group 
right, even though the group is in no way formally associated and even though its members 
value their language in a wholly instrumental fashion that has no significance for their 
identity. 
 
Groups and individual human rights 
 
Before turning to the issue of group rights, I want to notice a number of ways in which 
individual human rights support people’s group memberships and facilitate group activity. 
Individual human rights may seem divorced from people’s group memberships simply 
because they are rights possessed by human beings generally. By contrast, the rights that 
people possess as members of groups (other than as members of the human race) are ‘special’ 
rights – rights that people have only if and because they belong to the relevant group.  These 
special rights may therefore seem wholly disconnected from human rights.  In fact, they are 
underwritten by the human right to freedom of association which entitles people to belong or 
not to belong to groups as they see fit.  There are so many groups that people may wish to 
belong to or to form, and so many shared activities in which they may want to engage, that is 
it difficult to know how a body of norms could provide for all of those possibilities other than 
by according individuals the right to freedom of association.  
 Human rights also protect people’s group affiliations and identities by not being 
dependent upon them: people do not lose all or any of their human rights because of their 
group affiliations or identities.  Article 2 of the UDHR provides that everyone is entitled to 
all of the rights and freedoms set out in the Declaration ‘without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status’. That general prohibition on discrimination reappears 
frequently in other UN and regional statements of human rights. 
It is particularly important that we recognise that individual human rights can enable 
people to do things together that they cannot not do separately.  Consider the freedoms that 
typically figure in catalogues of human rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion and freedom of association. These freedoms are often considered the most 
individualist of rights since they accord individuals the freedom to choose and to act on their 
own choices.  Yet they are also closely associated with collective behaviour.   
That is most obviously true in the case of freedom of association.  One cannot 
associate on one’s own; one necessarily associates with others, so that to associate is to join 
with others in some form of interpersonal relation or shared activity.  Freedom of association 
includes the freedom not to associate, so it can be used to avoid or to withdraw from 
relationships.  Nevertheless, in its primary sense, the right is a right to associate with others 
as one wishes and the primary duty it imposes upon others, including governments, is the 
duty not to impede or prevent that association.   
 Freedom of expression can also enable collective conduct.  It is possible to argue with 
oneself but normally debate and discussion are inter-personal rather than intra-personal 
activities.  Those who engage in debate and discussion therefore exercise their individual 
rights to do something together that they could not do singly. 
 If a right is a right to engage in a collective activity, can it be a genuinely individual 
right?  If an activity is collective, the right to engage in it may seem necessarily to belong to 
the group of participants as a collectivity rather than to each participant separately.  Again, 
that is not so.  Two people who dance together do something that neither could do singly, but 
it does not follow that their right to dance together must be a collective right.  Rather A has 
the right to dance with B if B is so willing, and B has the right to dance with A if A is so 
willing, so that, in dancing together, A and B jointly exercise their individual rights to dance 
with one another rather than a joint or collective right that they possess only as a duo.  The 
same applies to the right to marry, the right to sing with others in a choir, and the right to 
participate with others in a street protest.  In each of these cases, people exercise their rights 
to engage in a shared activity, but the rights they exercise are rights that they possess as 
individual persons. 
 The joint use of individual rights is particularly significant for freedom of religion.  
That is recognised explicitly in Article 18 of the UDHR, which states that everyone’s right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion includes the freedom ‘either  alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance’ (my emphasis; see also the ICCPR art. 18, the ECHR art. 
9). It would be absurd if the right of freedom of religion did not include, for example, the 
right to engage in collective acts worship – acts in which people can engage only ‘in 
community with others’; but, once again, the rights exercised in that collective act are fully 
intelligible as the rights of the several individuals who participate in it. 
 Article 27 of the ICCPR uses the same phrase in providing for the rights of ethnic, 
religious and linguistic minorities: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language’ (my emphasis).  This time, there is 
no mention of the possibility that individuals might enjoy these rights ‘alone’ as well as ‘in 
community with’ others.  That is misleading.  Cultures and languages are necessary group 
phenomena, and religions almost always have a group dimension.  Nevertheless, an 
individual may still enjoy aspects of these group phenomena alone: I may, in private and on 
my own, practise a craft that is peculiar to my culture, read a novel that is written in my 
native language, and pray in accordance with a religion I share with my fellows.  My 
activities remain group-dependent since, if I were not a member of the group whose culture, 
language or religion I share, I would not have the wherewithal to do any of these things.  Yet, 
in these instances, the activities themselves are not ones that I engage in ‘in community with’ 
others.  Very frequently, however, enjoying a culture, practising a religion, and using a 
language will involve participating with others in group activity.  I can participate in a 
communal form of life, I can engage in a collective act of worship, and I can use my language 
as a tool of communication only ‘in community with’ others. 
 
Groups and collective human rights 
 
We should not suppose too readily therefore that group activity must signal the presence of a 
group right.  There are, however, rights to collective goods which, if they are rights, are 
intelligible only as group rights.  A clear example, strongly associated with human rights, is 
the right of a people to be self-determining.  That right is asserted in the first articles of the 
UN’s ICCCPR and ICESCR, and both Covenants go on to affirm that ‘by virtue of that right 
they [peoples] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development’.   
Might we conceive a people’s right to be self-determining as no more than the pooling 
together of several individuals’ rights to be self-determining, just as we can understand the 
right to engage in a collective act of worship as no more than the joint exercise of each 
participant’s individual right to freedom of worship?  This time that understanding of the 
right will not do.  The right that is asserted in the UN’s Covenants is the right of a people, as 
a people, to be self-determining and that is not the same as a set of individuals opting to 
exercise their individual rights of self-determination in a co-ordinated way.  The right is the 
right of a group to determine the course of its life as a group, rather than an aggregation of 
individual rights that enable individuals to engage in a common activity. 
 If there were an individual right that a people should be self-determining, it would 
have to be the right of an individual that his or her people (presumably the people to which he 
or she belonged) should be self-determining.  The obvious objection to any such alleged right 
would be its utter disproportionality: how could it be morally plausible that an individual, qua 
individual, should have a right over how an entire people should be treated?  Moreover, any 
such right would fly in the face of human rights thinking.  It is essential to that thinking that 
individual persons enjoy a fundamental equality of moral standing and possess rights over the 
conduct of their own lives.  If one individual, entirely on his own, were to have a right 
relating to the life of an entire people, he would, in effect, have rights over their lives, which  
would be odds with others’ equal standing and equal rights.   
 The right of a people to be self-determining must therefore be a group right.  Could it 
also be a human right?  The answer depends very much on how we understand the group that 
possesses the right.   
Group rights have traditionally been understood as rights held by groups conceived as 
unitary entities: just as the holder of an individual right is a single unitary entity (an 
individual person), so the holder of a group right has often been conceived as a single unitary 
entity, which we might think of as a ‘group-individual’ or ‘group-person’.  We might 
describe this way of understanding group rights as the ‘corporate’ conception, since it 
conceives the right-holding group as a single corporate entity.  The group is attributed with a 
being and identity that is not translatable, without remainder, into those of its members.  The 
rights of the group are therefore conceived as ‘its’ rights rather than ‘their’ rights.   
This conception of group rights is both uncontroversial and readily intelligible in the 
case of legal group rights.  Legal systems commonly ascribe legal personality to 
organisations, such as business corporations, so that those organisations can possess both 
standing and rights as ‘legal persons’.  More controversially, some proponents of group rights 
suggest that we should deploy the same corporate conception in our moral thinking (e.g. 
French 1984; Newman 2004, 2011).  If we do, we shall conceive a right-holding group as 
possessing a moral identity and a moral standing as a group that is not reducible to those of 
its members.  Moral standing is a precondition of right-holding and the attribution of moral 
standing to the group qua group means that it can hold rights as a group that are not rights 
possessed by the several individuals who constitute its members.  (Those who reject the very 
idea of group rights typically suppose that group rights must take this corporate form; e.g. 
Graff 1994; Hartney 1991.)  
If that is how we conceive group rights, it is very difficult to see how they could also 
be human rights, assuming that we continue to think of human rights as the rights of (natural) 
human persons.  On the corporate conception, a group right is held by an entity whose 
identity and a moral status is independent of those of its individual members and its rights are 
not to be understood as rights their rights.  Thus John Rawls (1999), for example, having 
conceived right-holding peoples according to the corporate conception, goes on to treat 
peoples’ rights as wholly separate from human rights. 
We can, however, conceive group rights quite differently and in a way that is more 
consonant with human rights thinking. We might describe this alternative understanding of 
group rights as the ‘collective’ conception, since it conceives group rights as rights held 
jointly by a collection of individuals. If we understand group rights in this way, we need not 
posit a group that possesses an identity and a standing that is separate from those of its 
members.  The relevant group will be simply the group of individuals who jointly hold the 
right, but their right will remain an authentic group right since it is a right that they will hold 
jointly and not singly.  People possess, as well as exercise, collective rights together.  The 
conception here is not therefore one in which each individual holds a right as an individual, 
and in which individuals’ rights are somehow aggregated to yield a collective right.  On the 
contrary, collective rights are rights that individuals hold only in combination with others.
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 In contrast with the corporate conception, the collective conception understands a 
group as, in Margaret Gilbert’s phrase (1989, 2), a ‘plural subject’ and accordingly conceives 
a group right as ‘their’ right rather than ‘its’ right.  The moral standing that underwrites the 
collective right is not that of a group entity but simply that of the several individuals who 
make up the right-holding group, yet their right remains a genuine group right, since it is a 
right that they hold together as a group and not separately as individuals. 
 If we understand a group right according to this collective model, it becomes possible 
for a right to be both a group right and a human right.  The standard objection to ascribing 
human rights to groups is that human rights are rights possessed only by human beings and 
only individual persons are human beings (e.g. Donnelly 2003, 23-27).  But, if we understand 
group rights according to the collective conception, they will be rights held by individual 
persons; they will differ from individual human rights only in being held by individual 
persons jointly rather than severally. 
 So we can understand a people’s right of self-determination as a right that is held 
jointly by the several individuals who make up the relevant people.  An external power that 
imposes its will upon them will violate the right of the subjugated population to be self-
determining, rather than the right of a group entity that is, for some reason, not fully 
intelligible as the body of individuals who actually constitute the people.  A people’s right of 
self-determination, so conceived, is readily intelligible as a collective human right.   
 Of course, not all collective rights will be human rights, just as not all individual 
rights are human rights. But there are several rights that, in addition to the right of popular 
self-determination, we can plausibly conceive as collective human rights.  We have seen how 
Article 27 of the ICCPR secures for religious, linguistic and ethnic minorities the rights to 
profess and practice their own religion, to use their own language, and to enjoy their own 
culture.
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  We have also seen how the Article ascribes those rights to the members of 
minorities individually, even though individuals will commonly exercise their rights ‘in 
community with’ others.  But there are rights relating to religion, language and culture that 
make sense only as group rights. 
 The Vienna Declaration issued by the World Conference on Human Rights, 1993, 
called on governments ‘to counter intolerance and related violence based on religion or belief 
… including the desecration of religious sites, recognizing that every individual has the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience, expression and religion’ (II.B.22).  If someone desecrates 
a religion’s sacred site, whose right does it violate?  The most plausible answer is a collective 
right of the religion’s adherents. Here the right is a right to one and the same thing for all 
adherents of the religion: the non-desecration of their sacred site.  The unitary nature of the 
right’s object differentiates the right from the rights of individuals to engage in a shared 
activity, such as a collective act of worship.  All of the religion’s adherents have the right to 
engage in a collective act of worship, but A’s right is the right of A to engage in that act, B’s 
right is the right of B to engage in that act, and so on. In that respect, the object of each 
individual’s right is non-identical.  But the sacred site cannot be disaggregated in that way, 
which is why it would be misplaced to attempt to disaggregate the right to its non-desecration 
into rights held severally and separately by the religion’s adherents.   
 Consider now the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992).  
Amongst many objectives and principles that Parties to the Charter recognise is ‘the need for 
resolute action to promote regional or minority languages in order to safeguard them’ 
(art.7.1.c).  The Charter does not formulate that need as a right, but let’s suppose that a 
minority whose language is under threat of erosion has a right that the society of which it is 
part should take steps to safeguard its language.  Once again, that right makes sense only as a 
right possessed by the minority collectively rather than by its members severally.  In this 
case, proportionality helps contribute to the case for the right’s being a collective right: it is 
most unlikely that the interest of a single individual in the maintenance of his language could 
justify the expenditure of resources required to achieve that goal (cf. Raz 1986, 187, 207-
209).  But we can amend the case to eliminate that sort of consideration.  Rather than merely 
failing to support a minority’s language, a government may set out deliberately to eradicate it.  
In that case, it seems no less appropriate to hold that the right the government violates is a 
collective right of the linguistic minority rather than a set of rights held separately by its 
individual members.  The reason resides in the collective nature of the bad that the 
government visits on the minority. 
 The UN’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) recognises group 
rights more explicitly and more extensively than any other of its Declarations or Conventions.   
It ascribes some rights to indigenous peoples, some to indigenous individuals, and some to 
both; but it assigns the majority of the rights to indigenous peoples and rightly so insofar as 
they are rights that make sense only as group rights.  These include the right of indigenous 
peoples to self-determination (art.3) and other rights that stem from that general right, such as 
the right ‘to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and 
cultural institutions’ (art.5).  They also include the right that their culture shall not be 
destroyed (art.8), the right not to be forcibly remove from their lands and territories (art.10), 
the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs (art.11).  Once again, 
the objects of the rights identify them as rights that indigenous people hold together and not 
separately. 
 The case of indigenous peoples does, however, raise the question of how far we can 
reasonably go in interpreting group rights as collective rights.  There is no clear obstacle to 
interpreting all of the rights mentioned in the previous paragraph as collective rights, but 
DRIP also recognises the historical injustices that indigenous peoples have suffered, such as 
the dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, and accords them a right of redress 
(art.28).  If group A wronged group B a century ago and if, as a consequence, B is now duty-
bound to compensate A, it is difficult to explicate that state of affairs using the collective 
conception since the sets of wronging and wronged individuals a century ago (A1 and B1) are 
non-identical with their current heirs (A2 and B2).  The idea of one group owing 
compensation to another makes more sense if we think of the relevant groups as 
transgenerational entities that have identities over and above that of any particular generation 
of members, and that, in turn, implies a corporate conception of groups A and B.  The 
passage of time will then make no difference to the identities of perpetrator and victim. We 
might save the collective conception by substituting the idea of rectification for that of 
compensation: because A1 wronged B1, A2 now holds goods that ought to be held by B2.  
A2 should therefore restore to B2 goods that would have been theirs had A1 not wronged B1.  
The historical injustice is then corrected without any implication that the injustice concerns 
an A, that transcends A1 and A2, and a B that transcends B1 and B2. 
 Yet our thinking on peoples’d territories is typically more corporate than collective in 
character.  We think, for example, of the legitimate territory of France as a territory that 
belongs to France conceived as a transgenerational entity with an unchanging identity.  We 
could think of it as belonging to the current population of French nationals, who, as they 
come into existence, inherit title from their forebears and, as they go out of existence, 
bequeath it to the next generation.  French territory will then have not a single right-holder, 
France the corporate entity, but a multitude of ever-changing collective right-holders 
concatenated across time.  But, insofar as we do not think in that way (and I cannot here 
consider whether we should), we cannot cast our thinking in terms of collective human rights.  
Moreover, while the idea of human rights can figure in argument that each people has a right 
to be self-determining and to have their territorial rights respected, that idea cannot determine 
for us the particular territory to which  a people has a right.  
 
Group threats to human rights 
 
Conceptual reasons are not the only reasons why commentators often resist the ascription of 
rights to groups.  Much of the resistance also stems from fear of the consequences of that 
ascription (cf. Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005; Okin 2002; Shachar 2001; Tamir 1999).  
A major practical purpose – perhaps the major purpose – of ascribing human rights to 
individuals is to provide them with safeguards against the abuse of power.  Power-holders 
include groups, particularly groups that possess internal structures of authority.  If we ascribe 
human rights to groups, such as the right of self-government, we may find ourselves 
enhancing the very power that human rights are supposed to keep in check. In enhancing a 
group’s power, we may increase its capacity to oppress its own members; if we then upbraid 
the group for its oppressive conduct, it can respond by insisting that it is doing no more than 
exercising its human right to self-government.  It is not surprising therefore that many 
proponents of human rights insist that we should ascribe human rights to the individual 
members of a group but not to the group itself. 
 How should we respond to this concern?  The obvious answer is by being 
discriminating in the rights we attribute to groups.  We do not ascribe to individuals the right 
to do just anything, nor should we to groups.  There is no reason why, if we recognise some 
collective rights as human rights, we must slide ineluctably towards entitling a group to 
wrong its own members. 
 There is a logical feature of the collective conception of group rights that stands in the 
way of that slide.  By common consent, an individual cannot hold a right against himself; he 
cannot be simultaneously the bearer of a right and the bearer of the duty that the right 
imposes.  An individual’s rights must be directed ‘outwards’ towards others.  The same logic 
applies to jointly held rights.  A group of individuals who jointly hold a right cannot hold that 
right against themselves as a group, nor can any individual in the right-holding group jointly 
hold the right against herself.  Thus group rights understood according to the collective model 
must, like individual rights, be externally directed.  They will be rights directed at outsiders 
rather than rights targeted at members of the right-holding group.  That is, indeed, how we 
would ordinarily understand the orientation of a people’s rights to collective self-
determination, or the right of a religious group not to have its sacred sites desecrated, or the 
right of a linguistic community not to suffer deliberate efforts to erode its language. 
 We shall see in a moment that it is not quite that straightforward, but there is here a 
significant contrast between the collective and corporate conceptions.   On the corporate 
conception, a right-holding group has a being and a standing that is independent of its 
individual members and that makes it possible for the group as one entity to hold rights 
against its members conceived as other entities.  A corporate right can therefore be directed 
inwardly towards the group’s own members.  That feature of the corporate model has done 
much to inspire fear and suspicion of group rights and hostility to the suggestion that groups 
might possess human rights.  But, as we have seen, we have reason not to accept that groups 
corporately conceived can be the bearers of human rights.   
 Jettisoning the corporate for the collective conception of group rights does not, 
however, dispose entirely of the possibility of conflict between the power of a group and the 
human rights of its members.  Since I have pressed the case for collective human rights, I 
want to notice that even the collective conception can be deployed in ways that are inimical 
to the human rights of a group’s members.  A moment ago I pointed out that, logically, 
collective rights can be directed only outwards, that is, only towards people who are external 
to the right-holding group.  How, then, could collective rights ever constitute a threat to 
members of the right-holding group?  In what follows I want to notice two possibilities: one 
arises from a possible asymmetry between group membership and collective right-holding; 
the other arises out of the interest theory of rights. 
 As a way of getting to grips with the first possibility, consider a set of individuals who 
agree to form a yacht-racing crew.  We can say that each crew member has a duty to the 
others to play his full part in their shared endeavour and each is the object of a right held 
jointly by the others to play his due part.  Now suppose that one member, Smith, fails to pull 
his weight and as a consequence the crew loses races it would otherwise have won.  Smith 
infringes a collective right that the other members of the crew hold against him. That 
collective right remains ‘externally’ directed since it is a right of which Smith himself is not a 
joint holder; rather, he bears the duty that stems from the joint right. It is possible therefore 
for someone to share group-membership with others but, within the group, to be the object of 
a collective right in which he does not share.  
Now consider the same possibility in relation to a people’s right of self-determination.  
In the ordinary run of cases, a people will hold that right against parties external to itself. But 
suppose that a member of a people turns traitor and conspires to undermine his people’s right 
of self-determination either by delivering them into the hands of a foreign power or by 
imposing his own rule upon them.  In that case, the conspirator violates a right held jointly by 
rest of the people that he should not deny them their freedom to be self-determining.  Here 
again we have an individual who shares a group-membership with the collective right holders 
but who, in these circumstances, is the object of their right rather than one of its holders.   
In both of these cases, we may find nothing untoward in the claim that the collective 
right makes upon the group-member.  It is entirely reasonable for a yachting crew to require 
each member to play his due part and for a people to require each of their fellows not to 
subvert their collective freedom to be self-determining.  But now consider another case.   
A group distinguished by its common cultural heritage is split between a majority and 
a minority.  The majority wants to continue with the group’s inherited way of life; the 
minority wants to break away from it.  The majority asserts its collective right to the group’s 
inherited culture and protests that the dissent and deviance of the minority is subverting the 
way of life to which they are heir.  They therefore claim the right to compel the minority to 
comply with the group’s traditional mode of life, even though the minority wish not to live 
that form of life.  Here again we have a collective right that is mobilised by some members of 
a group against others, but this time in a way that runs counter to rights that we would 
normally deem human rights.  
Consider now a second possibility. As before, a cultural group is split between a 
traditionalist majority and a dissenting minority, but this time the majority responds not by 
asserting a collective right against the minority but by insisting that the minority has mistaken 
its interest.  If the dissenters understood their interest correctly, they would see that it was 
identical with the majority’s.  They would also appreciate that, because of that coincidence of 
interest, they shared in the group’s collective right to live its traditional mode of life.  Thus, 
the benighted minority can be compelled to remain members of the group and to comply with 
its traditional norms all in the name of a collective right in which they allegedly share. 
The possibility of ‘undesired’ rights of this sort is not unique to collective rights.  It 
arises from the interest theory of rights together with our ability to impute interests to people 
that depart from their own view of their interests.  It is therefore a possibility that can arise in 
relation to individual rights. However, it is perhaps more likely to arise in group contexts 
since, if individuals share a group membership, that commonality can spawn the belief that 
the group’s members possess a common interest, which grounds a collective right in which 
they all share, even though some in the group mistake what their common interest is.  
Rousseau is a celebrated example of a philosopher whose thought took that direction. 
These possibilities are no more than logical possibilities.  They show only that we 
cannot rely on the mere concept of a collective right to ensure that collective rights will never 
be invoked to the detriment of human rights.  Substantively, we should deal with this issue by 
holding that individual human rights set the limits of legitimate collective claims, just as they 
limit other forms of power.  Moreover, when a group claim comes up against an individual 
human right, we should not say that the individual right trumps a group right; rather we 
should say that, in these circumstances, the group has no right, since human rights set the 
boundaries of  group entitlements.  But, allowing that individual human rights must curtail 
the claims of groups in this way, does not require us to set aside the idea of collective human 
rights. It requires only that we must ensure that individual and collective human rights taken 
together form a coherent and consistent set. 
 
Conclusion 
 
If, then, we conceive group rights collectively rather than corporately, it is open to us to claim 
some group rights as human rights.  Vindicating that claim will require us to show that the 
interests at stake justify the claim of right and that the putative human right passes a suitable 
test of universality, insofar as universality is a necessary feature of human rights (cf. Cruft 
2005; Donnelly 2007).  Does it really matter whether a group right is a human right?  Why 
not keep group rights separate from human rights in the way that they are separated in, for 
example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights? One answer is that, if, as I 
have argued, human rights can intelligibly and coherently take the form of collective rights, it 
would be odd to pretend otherwise.  A second is that, insofar as collective rights are human 
rights, their bearers have the same moral identity as those who possess individual human 
rights; we make plain that the rights are not borne by an entity that is a categorically different, 
and potentially rivalrous, moral claimant.  Finally, given the special moral and political 
significance that attaches to human rights, it seems arbitrary to insist that human rights can 
pertain only to goods to which individuals can have individual rights and never to goods to 
which they can hold rights only collectively.    
 
  
Notes 
 
1. For examples of argument that human rights cannot be group rights, see Donnelly 2003, 
23-27; Graff 1994; Griffin 2008; Miller 2002; Waldron 1993, 339-69. For examples of the 
contrary claim, see Felice 1996; Freeman 1995; Mello 2004; Van Dyke 1985. 
 
2. The rights that people possess as members of national, ethnic or cultural groups are now 
often described as ‘group rights’ (e.g. Casals 2006) and Kymlicka’s term ‘group-
differentiated right’ is frequently abbreviated to ‘group right’ (e.g. Pogge 1997; Miller 2002).  
But both sorts of right might be held by a group’s members severally rather than collectively 
(Kymlicka 1995, 46; Jones 2010). 
 
3. For statements of the collective conception of groups, see Jones 1999; Miller 2001, 210-
233; Raz 1986, 207-209. 
 
4. Although Article 27 refers only to minorities, the rights it enunciates are intended to be 
universal rather than unique to minorities.  Its import is that, even if a group find itself in a 
minority position in a state, its members are still entitled, like the majority population, to 
enjoy their culture, to profess and practise their religion and to use their own language. 
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